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In an article to be published in the journal Microbial Pathogenesis , Chinese researchers report on a 4 year serological surveillance project of Influenza A on pigs farms in   Guangdong, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Yunnan Provinces in Southern China.[1] As the authors note, pigs are believe to be intermediate hosts or mixing vessels of pandemic influenza viruses. Influenza viruses can undergo reassortment in pigs, allowing the virus to adapted to humans and possibly cause a pandemic. The serological study used haemagglutination inhibition (HI) tests to examine antibodies of H5 and H9 viruses among the samples from pigs. The good news is that the researchers failed to find H5 infections (Clade 2.3.2) within the pig samples. A ressortant H5N1 virus from pigs could easily start the next pandemic. H5 viruses have already infected more than 600 people from numerous countries in the last decade, so an H5N1 pandemic is a serious concern. The bad news is that the authors found an infection rat...

Slightly more than 100 cases of Middle East Respiratory Coronavirus   (MERS-CoV) infections have been reported from around the world. Despite these few numbers, the actual count of cases is uncertain as is the geographic distribution of the cases.   The case count varies from 94 to 104 as noted in the table below compiled from several sources. [1,2,3,4]  A review of these reports indicates that the variability in the counts results from several factors. First, some reports such as those from the World Health Organization (WHO) are not current and up-to-date. The fact that WHO is not stating the count by individual member states indicates uncertainty about how to report the geolocations of individual cases (see discussion below). Second, some agencies such as WHO only count officially confirmed cases, while other case lists seem to include probable and suspected cases as well. Third, compounding the enumeration problem is that sometimes asymptomatic cases that test positi...

As noted by the Center for Disease Control, USA (CDC), although A(H7N9) is not currently spreading human-to-human, the disease is often severe and has a high mortality rate and  there is no current vaccine for A(H7N9) influenza.[1] The only viable option for infected individuals is early treatment with antivirals. The CDC recommends early antiviral treatment with neuraminidase inhibitors, noting that laboratory research indicates that adamantane derivatives will not inhibit replication of A(H7N9) virus. An article published behind a paywall in Antiviral Therapy by Chinese researchers entitled Inhibition of novel reassortant avian influenza H7N9 virus infection in vitro with three antiviral drugs, oseltamivir, peramivir and favipiravir confirms the CDC recommendations. [2] The authors note that A(H7N9) was resistant to amantadine and remantadine, but was sensitive to two neuraminidase inhibitors, oseltamivir, peramivir, and  the investigational drug, favipiravir (T-705). Not...

Emerging Infectious Diseases has published (ahead of print) an article entitled Geographic Co-distribution of Influenza Virus Subtypes H7N9 and H5N1 in Humans, China by Chinese researchers comparing the geospatial epidemiologic characteristics of A(H5N1) and A(H7N9) in China. [1] The authors compare the geographic distribution of cases for A(H5N1) and A(H7N9) throughout China at the township level and determine  . . . that the high-risk areas for human infection with subtype H7N9 and H5N1 viruses are co-distributed in an area bordering the provinces of Anhui and Zhejiang . . . The township is a level 4 administrative division in China. Within China, level 1 administrative divisions are provinces, province-level municipalities, autonomous region, and special administrative regions. Level 2 are prefecture-level divisions, and county-level divisions are level 3.   Although the analysis was conducted on township-level divisions the authors present the conclusion by provinces. G...